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COMMENT
QUIET MONKEYS: HOW SILENCE SPEAKS TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACADEMIC
FREEDOM ACTS
E. Scott Copelandt
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the Louisiana legislature enacted the Louisiana Science
Education Act, designed to allow public school teachers the opportunity to
objectively critique scientific controversies.1 Tennessee followed with a
similar statute in 2012.2 Those critiques include the origins of life, global
warming, and human cloning, but the one critique that has generated the
most controversy is the critique of evolution, or more specifically, neo-
Darwinism.3
The statutes have not been challenged in court as of yet, but should be
found to be constitutional. Specifically, the history of the evolution debate
and the opposition to the academic freedom acts suggest that the challenge
will be phrased as an Establishment Clause violation. Critics of the statute
erroneously connect the statutes to the evolution/creationism debate and
decry the statutes as the next attempt to get religious views of science into
the classroom. Consequently, it is helpful to understand the progression of
evolution's status from a minor theory of human origins to the zealously
guarded "king of the hill," whose defenders strive to ensure that any critique
on evolution is painted with a religious motive.
The statutes are, at best, tangentially connected to the evolution cases. In
Edwards v. Aguillard, the U.S. Supreme Court admitted that scientific
t The author is currently a third year law student at Liberty University School of
Law. He would like to extend his thanks to Professor Joseph Martins for the inspiration for
this article. He would also like to thank Casey Luskin and Adam Walton for their assistance
in editing. Finally, the author would like to thank his wife, Brandi, for her constant
support in his law school endeavors and God, without whom nothing would be possible nor
worthwhile.
1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
4. Barbara Forrest, Talking Points Opposing HB 1168,
CREATIONISMSTROJANHORSE.COM, http://www.creationismstrojanhorse.com/
HB_168_TalkingPoints.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
5. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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critiques of evolution could be allowed-the Court simultaneously
disallowed creationism in the classroom.6 It is incorrect and misleading to
impute a religious motive to the academic freedom acts. Religion might
have been a purpose in the cases involving creationism, but it was not a
purpose of either legislature when passing the recent academic freedom
acts. Both statutes specifically prohibit any use of the critiques as a religious
exercise and limit the discussion to objective, scientific facts The statutes
are only an attempt to allow students to develop critical thinking skills and
improve scientific understanding.
The moment of silence cases present a strong parallel to the academic
freedom acts. The Circuit Courts (and the Supreme Court) have
overwhelmingly held that a statute that has a secular purpose but also
accommodates religion does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.'
The moment of silence cases show that a school can implement a statute
that is facially neutral as to religion-but allows for incidental religious
effects-and stay within the confines of the Constitution.' The academic
freedom acts do not even go that far. While there might be some incidental
effects to religion (akin to a silent prayer left to the individual student) from
a scientific critique, religion cannot be advanced by the school.1 ° If the
Court found that the moment of silence statutes do not violate the
Constitution, it is likely to find that the academic freedom acts also do not
offend the First Amendment. The similarities between the moment of
silence statutes and academic freedom acts show that the academic freedom
acts are constitutional, both on their face and in application as enacted.
To determine the constitutionality of the academic freedom acts, the
court will likely measure the statutes against the Lemon test, and possibly
the endorsement test, in ascertaining their constitutionality. The court will
probably also inquire into the statutes' legislative histories to ascertain the
legislatures' purposes in passing the Acts. An examination of the legislative
history of both academic freedom acts shows that neither legislature had a
religious purpose for enacting the statutes, even if the purpose coincided
with the religious intent of individual legislators.11 The statutes also pass
muster against the three prongs of the Lemon test: they have a clear secular
purpose in fostering critical thinking, they do not have a primary effect of
6. Id. at 593, 596-97.
7. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
8. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001).
9. Id.
10. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
11. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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advancing or inhibiting religion and they do not require any excessive
government entanglement with religion.1 2
Each of the moment of silence statutes was examined under the same
test." The one outlier, which leaves large discretion to the individual courts,
is the endorsement test. Although none of the courts examined the moment
of silence statutes with the endorsement test, the courts have utilized the
endorsement test in other Establishment challenges. 4
When considered in light of the moment of silence cases, the academic
freedom acts should be found to be constitutional. They do not coerce a
student into any belief. Instead, they allow the student to form his own
conclusions about the critiques and they advance the clear secular purpose
of fostering the critical thinking and scientific understanding of the
individual students.'" Consequently, the academic freedom acts do not
violate the Establishment Clause.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Creation/Evolution Debate
The teaching of human origins in the public schools looks entirely
different than it did one hundred years ago. 6 The teaching of evolution has
completely eroded and replaced the Biblical worldview of teaching human
origins. In a series of contentious cases, the courts first famously allowed a
statute that prohibited the teaching of human evolution, 7 then held that
evolution could not be kept out of the classroom, allowing it to be taught
alongside Biblical origins, 8 and finally threw out any creationist view of
origins entirely. 9 Evolution became firmly entrenched as the only court-
approved origins theory and evolution supporters vehemently opposed any
viable alternatives, keeping the alternative theories at bay by labeling them
as creationism.2" The court decisions subsequently supported evolution,
12. Lemonv. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
13. See discussion infra Part II.B-F.
14. See, e.g., Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburg Chapter, 492 U.S.
573 (1989).
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
16. Robert E. Morelli, Survival of the Fittest: An Examination of the Louisiana Science
Education Act, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 797,800-17 (2010).
17. See Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
18. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
19. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
20. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 717 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
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going as far as to wade into the waters of determining the criteria of a
scientific theory,2' well outside of the proper scope of the judiciary.
The modern controversy surrounding the teaching of the origin of
humans in public schools began with the famous Scopes trial in 1927.22 John
Scopes was charged with violating Chapter 27 of the Acts of 1925, known as
the Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act, which made it unlawful to teach that"man has descended from a lower order of animals."23 The American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") decided to challenge the constitutionality of
Tennessee's laws and tested the anti-evolution laws.24 That test was not
successful and the court did not allow evolution in the classroom, 2 but the
camel's nose of evolution was under the proverbial tent.
Scopes was subsequently convicted and fined one hundred dollars, but
the Tennessee Supreme Court overturned the fine on a technicality.26 The
court likened the statute banning evolution to the act of the State as a
corporation, which allowed the corporation to dictate the "character of
work the master's servant shall, or rather shall not, perform."27 The court
held that the statute did not violate the Tennessee Constitution or the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
allowed the continued ban on teaching evolution in public schools. 2 In
contradiction to modern jurisprudence, the court also dismissed the
argument concerning the intent of the legislature in passing the act.29 The
court indicated that a statute should be judged by the effects that follow its
enforcement, not the motives that precede its enactment.3" While Scopes did
not represent a victory for the supporters of evolution, it did represent the
first challenge to the then dominant theory of human origins.3
21. Id. at 735-46.
22. Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
23. Id. at 364 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. ACLU History: The Scopes 'Monkey Trial,' ACLU, https://www.aclu.orglreligion-
belief/aclu-history-scopes-monkey-trial (last visited Dec. 16, 2014).
25. Scopes, 289 S.W. at 367. The court held that the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction
in levying the fine, as only a jury could impose the penalty, and subsequently reversed the
trial court's decision. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 365.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 367.
31. Morelli, supra note 16, at 800.
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1. Creationism and Evolution in the Classroom
Evolution took its next major step to dominance when the Supreme
Court held in Epperson v. Arkansas32 that a state could not ban the teaching
of evolution in the public school classroom.33 Evolution found its way into
the classroom and existed alongside Biblical origins in a tenuous
relationship. The forty-year absence of a challenge to the teaching of human
origins ended in 1968 when a newly hired science teacher in Little Rock,
Arkansas challenged a 1928 state statute that forbade the teaching of the"theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower
order of animals" in any state-supported school or university.34 The teacher
sought a declaration that the statute was void and asked the court to enjoin
the State and the school system officials from dismissing her for a violation
of the statute."
In Epperson, the Court analyzed the statute under the First Amendment
of the Constitution and concluded that "the First Amendment does not
permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to
the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma."36 The Court
refused to view the statute as an act of religious neutrality.37 Instead, it
characterized the act as an attempt to block a particular theory that was in
conflict with the Biblical account of the origin of man. Accordingly, the
Court determined that the Arkansas statute was unconstitutional because it
was "contrary to the mandate of the First, and in violation of the
Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution."39 The Court concluded that
the State could not adopt practices that lend direct aid to any religion.4" In
the Court's view, the State had no legitimate interest in protecting any or all
religions from views that are distasteful to them.4' As a result of Epperson,
the State was unable to restrict the teaching of evolution in the public school
classroom and evolution moved alongside Biblical origins as alternative
theories in the classroom.42
32. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
33. Id. at 109.
34. Id. at 98-99.
35. Id. at 100.
36. Id. at 106.
37. Id. at 109.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 107.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 109.
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Shortly thereafter, the Court initiated the modern jurisprudence in
regard to Establishment Clause analysis. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,43
challengers to Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes contended that the
statutes provided aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools.'
In determining that both statutes violated the Establishment Clause, the
Court first articulated the Lemon test that has become the standard for
Establishment Clause analysis.4" The Lemon test consists of three prongs: (1)
the legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose, (2) the
statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and (3) the statute must not result in an excessive
entanglement of government with religion.46
The Court applied the first prong of the test and concluded that the
legislatures did not intend to advance religion.47 In fact, both statutes clearly
stated that the purpose of the statutes was to enhance secular education.48
The Court did not address the second prong, but it found a violation of the
third prong, since the statute created an excessive entanglement between
the government and religion.49 Although commentators have criticized the
Lemon test for its questionable effectiveness,"° the test continues to be the
controlling standard for the Court's approach to Establishment Clause
cases.5'
The Lemon test was subsequently applied in Edwards v. Aguillard,s2
which involved a Louisiana statute 3 ("Louisiana Creationism Act") that
forbade the teaching of the theory of evolution in public and secondary
schools unless it was accompanied by instruction in the theory of "creation
43. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
44. Id. at 606.
45. Id. at 625; Louis J. Virelli III, Making Lemonade: A New Approach to Evaluating
Evolution Disclaimers Under the Establishment Clause, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 423,435 (2006).
46. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
47. Id. at 613.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 613-14.
50. Virelli, supra note 45, at 434-37. Virelli criticizes the under- inclusiveness of the
Lemon test by arguing that a statute is deemed unconstitutional only if it is found to have no
secular purpose. Id. at 436-37. He also argues that the test is under-inclusive because it
applies only where the primary consequence of a statute is to advance or inhibit religion and
does not account for the difficulty in measuring or the ease of disguising the primacy of a
particular statute. Id. at 436.
51. Id. at435.
52. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7 (1982).
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science."54 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals'
decision, holding that this statute violated the Establishment Clause.55
The Court applied the Lemon test, focusing primarily on the first prong
and the motivations of the legislators in enacting the legislation.56 The
Court concluded that the purpose of the Creationism Act was to promote a
particular religfous viewpoint.57 Ironically, in a foreshadowing of the
academic freedom acts, the Court stated that its holding did not imply "that
a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing
scientific -theories be taught."" Thus, evolution moved from being the
outsider attempting to win acceptance in the classroom to pushing aside
any alternative theory that could be construed to "achieve a religious
purpose. '"59
2. Evolution Disclaimers
Interestingly, scientific critiques were the subject of three more cases
involving alternatives to evolution through the use of disclaimers. Evolution
disclaimers are statements that encourage students to consider scientific
critiques to evolution.6° They are initiated by the local school boards that
mandate the disclaimers to be delivered to the district's students.6" The
disclaimers have two basic varieties in the presentation of critiques of
evolutionary theory: statements read before a discussion of evolution in the
classroom6 2 or textbook stickers that remind students that evolution is only
a theory. 3
In Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education,64 a group of parents
brought a challenge to the local school board's resolution calling for the
reading of a prepared statement that encouraged students to use critical
thinking and "examine each alternative toward forming an opinion."65 The
54. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581.
55. Id. at 596-97.
56. Id. at 587.
57. Id. at 593.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 597.
60. Virelli, supra note 45, at 431.
61. Id.
62. Freilier v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1999);
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
63. Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006).
64. Freilier, 185 F.3d 337.
65. Id. at 341.
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resolution mandated that the statement be read prior to any discussion of
evolution in elementary or high school.66
Applying the first prong of the Lemon test, the Fifth Circuit held that the
school board's statement fulfilled two secular purposes in disclaiming
orthodoxy of belief and reducing offense to students and parents.67
Nonetheless, the court held that the statement violated the second prong of
the test by impermissibly advancing religion.6' The court stated, "[T]he
primary effect of the disclaimer is to protect and maintain a particular
religious viewpoint, namely belief in the Biblical view of creation. "69
Consequently, the court held that the statute authorizing the disclaimers
impermissibly advanced religion.70
The controversy centered on the inclusion of the phrase "Biblical version
of Creation" in the statement.' The court found that the "benefit to religion
conferred by the reading of the Tangipahoa disclaimer is more than
indirect, remote or incidental."72 In looking to the effect of the disclaimer,
the court did not consider the relative weight of those effects or whether
they were even intended or foreseen by the legislature.73 Instead of looking
to whether the primary effect of the disclaimer was to advance or inhibit
religion, the court simply concluded that religious effects were sufficient to
invalidate the disclaimer.74 Thus, the court's decision did not speak to the
constitutionality of scientific critiques of evolution, but whether the
resolution gave some type of advantage to religion.
Critiques of evolution encountered another hurdle with the introduction
of the endorsement test.7" In Selman v. Cobb County School District,7 6 a case
involving a textbook disclaimer, the district court came to a similar
66. Id.
67. Id. at 345-46.
68. Id. at 348.
69. Id. at 346.
70. Id. at 348.
71. Id. at 341.
72. Id. at 348.
73. Virelli, supra note 45, at 440-41. Virelli argues that the approach of the court is
overbroad because legislation cannot be held to be unconstitutional because it has a single,
non-negligible religious effect. Id. The over-inclusiveness may lead to a chilling on the
legislative process. Id. at 441.
74. Id.
75. Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburg Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989). The "reasonable observer" is imbued with the "history and ubiquity" of a practice.
The Court states that the "history and ubiquity" provides part of the context in which a
reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a
message of endorsement of religion. Id. at 630.
76. Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
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conclusion as the court in Freiler, concluding that the disclaimers
impermissibly entangled the school board with religion.77 The school board
in Cobb County, Georgia determined that a disclaimer sticker would be
placed on the inside of the new science textbooks that read, "This textbook
contains material on evolution. Evolution is a theory, not a fact, regarding
the origin of living things. This material should be approached with an open
mind, studied carefully, and critically considered.""
While the district court found that the disclaimer had a secular purpose,
in line with the first prong of the Lemon test, it bypassed the second prong.79
Instead of looking at the effects of the disclaimer, the court looked to the"events that led to the sticker's adoption," and concluded that the sticker
made those that endorse evolution feel like political outsiders."0 The court
applied the endorsement test and found that the "reasonable observer"
knew the history of the events that led to the adoption of the disclaimer
sticker." Hence, the reasonable observer would therefore interpret the
sticker to convey a message of government endorsement of religion."
The district court reasoned that, because there had been historical
opposition to evolution by "Christian fundamentalists ... throughout the
nation," the reasonable observer would "infer that the School Board's
problem with evolution to be that evolution does not acknowledge a
creator." 3 Such an analysis is a non sequitur and provides no framework for
any type of future analysis of disclaimers." The fact that religious groups
supported a statute in another setting, or at another time, is not indicative
that the statute at hand is similarly supported, if that fact should even be
dispositive at all. Such a test simply leaves the court with the ability to
choose how much knowledge the "reasonable observer" possesses, which
may, as seen in Selman, turn the case.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found the record to be incomplete and
vacated the district court's decision, remanding the case for additional
proceedings. Faced with the expense of re-litigating, the School Board
agreed to a settlement and removed the stickers.8 6
77. Id. at 1328.
78. Id. at 1324.
79. Id. at 1327.
80. Id. at 1327-28.
81. Id. at 1328.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Virelli, supra note 45, at 442.
85. Selman, 449 F.3d at 1338.
86. Press Release, Cobb County School District, Agreement Ends Textbook Sticker Case
(Dec. 19, 2006) (on file with author) available at
20151
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3. Intelligent Design and Disclaimers
Finally, in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,7 a case that occurred
simultaneously with Selman, the District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania determined that no disclaimer could be read before the
teaching of evolution." The court held that the disclaimer pointed to
Intelligent Design ("ID") 9 and therefore violated the Establishment
Clause. ° The disclaimer alerted students that evolution is a theory and not a
fact.9" The disclaimer pointed out that there is no evidence for some of the
gaps in evolution, and it mentioned ID as an alternative explanation for the
origin of life.92 The disclaimer also pointed students to a textbook that
referenced ID.93
The court in Kitzmiller began its exhaustive analysis of the Dover School
Board disclaimer by applying the endorsement test.94 It concluded that a
reasonable objective observer, either student or adult, would consider the
disclaimer to be an endorsement of religion.9 As part of the endorsement
test analysis, the court then laid out a lengthy explanation for the basis of
ID, predominantly to attribute a religious motive to ID.96 ID is no more
religious than evolution,97 but the court attributed a religious motive to ID
because ID posits a Designer" despite the fact that ID makes no attempt to
identify any Designer.9 Having thus burdened the reasonable observer with
http://ncse.com/files/pub/legal/selman/retria2OO6/20061219-Sticker-Agreement-Cobb-we
bsite.pdf.
87. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
88. Id. at 766.
89. Stephen C. Meyer, A Scientific History-and Philosophical Defense--of the Theory of
Intelligent Design, 7 Religion - Staat - Gesellschaft (Oct. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.discovery.org/a/7471. Intelligent Design is an "evidence-based scientific theory
about life's origins that challenges strictly materialistic views of evolution." Id. "[Iintelligent
design holds that there are tell-tale features of living systems and the universe ... that are
best explained by an intelligent cause rather than an undirected material process." Id.
90. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 709.
91. Id. at 708.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 709.
94. Id. at 714-34.
95. Id. at 723-24, 731.
96. Id. at 716-23.
97. Johnny Rex Buckles, The Constitutionality of the Monkey Wrench: Exploring the
Case for Intelligent Design, 3 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 329,370-73 (2009).
98. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 720 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
99. David K. DeWolf, John G. West & Casey Luskin, Intelligent Design Will Survive
Kitzmiller v. Dover, 68 MONT. L. REV. 7, 28-29 (2007).
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the "history" of the evolution debate, the court had little problem in holding
that the disclaimer violated the Establishment Clause. 00
In an unprecedented and controversial step,'0 ' the court also took upon
itself the task of defining "science," 1°2 concluding that Intelligent Design is
not science." 3 It interpreted a definition of "science" from the National
Academy of Sciences,0 4 and concluded that ID cannot be a credible
alternative to evolution.0 5 The determination by the court of a question that
has vexed scientists for centuries represented uncharted territory in the
dance between science and religion. One commentator noted that "[t]he
part of Kitzmiller that finds ID not to be science is unnecessary,
unconvincing, not particularly suited to the judicial role, and even perhaps
dangerous both to science and to freedom of religion."0 6
Finally, the court applied the first and second prongs of the Lemon test to
the disclaimer.07 It found that the legislative history and motives of the
school board were a pretext to the board's real purpose, which belied any
secular purpose of the disclaimer.108 The court also stated that the effect of
the disclaimer was to "impose a religious view of biological origins" on the
classroom." 9 There are, however, multiple questions as to the validity of the
court's determination. 0 The uncertainty of the endorsement test was
clearly seen in Kitzmiller, with the "reasonable observer" given "knowledge"
that was falsely attributed to ID, incorrectly linking ID to creationism, and
creating an Establishment Clause violation.
The progression of evolution from the outlier to the dominant theory of
origins in the public school classroom has been slow but steady."' As a
result of the removal of religious origins from the classroom, even a critique
of evolution with legitimate secular purposes that is supported by religious
100. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 746.
101. DeWolf, supra note 99, at 27-42.
102. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
103. Id. at 745-46.
104. Id. at 735-36.
105. Id. at 736.
106. Jay D. Wexler, Kitzmiller and the "Is It Science?" Question, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 90,
93 (2006).
107. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 763-64.
108. Id. at 763.
109. Id. at 764.
110. DeWolf, supra note 99, at 54-55. "[Judge Jones's] decision relies upon a highly
selective recitation of the facts, an obviously inadequate understanding of the scientific issues
involved, and a distorted understanding of the principle of religious neutrality. As a result,
Judge Jones's opinion will serve future judges only with an example of how not to analyze the
issues that were presented to him." Id. at 55.
111. Morelli, supra note 16, at 800-17.
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persons can be rejected. 12 A critique or alternative theory is attributed to a
religious motive, as seen in Kitzmiller, and linked to the creationism cases,
with which the critique may have absolutely no connection.113 Hence,
critiques must overcome the label of being "unscientific" because they
question the current dominant theory, but must also bear the burden of the
false imputation of motives that are leveled at such accusations.
B. Moment of Silence Cases
Another series of Establishment Clause cases that occurred over the last
few decades involved statutes that resemble the academic freedom acts.
Such cases give a strong indication of how a court may hold in analyzing the
constitutionality of the academic freedom acts." 4 These cases involve the
statutory allowance of a "moment of silence" in public schools, which
simply allows for a prescribed moment of silence, usually at the beginning
of the school day."5 A student can use the moment for whatever purpose he
or she decides, as long as the student remains silent."6 The moment of
silence statutes do not prescribe any religious activity and allow the student
to choose how to use that time." 7 There may be incidental effects to religion
if a student chooses to pray silently, but the decision of how to use the time
is left to the individual student and not the school or the teacher."'
Similarly, the academic freedom acts do not mandate how students utilize
the scientific critiques of evolution." 9 The academic freedom acts are
inherently neutral as to religion. 20 In fact, the academic freedom acts go
even further than the moment of silence statutes in disallowing any
112. Casey Luskin, Does Challenging Darwin Create Constitutional Jeopardy? A
Comprehensive Survey of Case Law Regarding the Teaching of Biological Origins, 32 HAMLINE
L. REV. 1, 56 (2009).
113. Morelli, supra note 16, at 799.
114. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d
501 (7th Cir. 2010); Croft v. Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735 (5th Cir. 2009); Brown v.
Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001); Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1464 (11th
Cir. 1997); Mayv. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1985).
115. See, e.g., Cooperman, 780 F.2d at 241.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008). The statute does not mention what
inferences the student should draw from the critiques of evolution. Id.
120. Id. The statute expressly notes that it cannot be used for any religious purpose. Id.
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religious use of the critiques while the moment of silence cases often
expressly allow prayer at the student's discretion. 21
Federal courts have heard six major cases that examined moment of
silence statutes and, in the overwhelming majority of the cases, the courts
found that the statutes violated neither the Lemon test nor consequently, the
Establishment Clause. 22 The two cases in which the statutes were struck
down turned on: (1) the fact that the bill's sponsor refused to offer any
secular purpose for the statute in Wallace v. Jaffree,123 and (2) the fact that
the Third Circuit could not find the district court's fact-finding of a pretext
to be clearly erroneous in May v. Cooperman.124 Both cases clearly suggest
that a clear secular purpose under the first Lemon prong would have led the
courts to find that the statutes did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Hence, the Establishment Clause analysis of these statutes under the Lemon
test is instructive as to how a court might hold in reviewing the academic
freedom acts.
1. Wallace v. Jaffree
The only Supreme Court case that examined a moment of silence statute
was Wallace v. Jaffree.125 In Wallace, the Court considered whether an
Alabama statute mandating a moment of silence in public school was
constitutional.'26 The appellee filed a claim on behalf of his minor children,
challenging the constitutionality of three statutes.127 The three statutes
authorized a period of silence for "meditation," "for meditation or
voluntary prayer," and for teachers to lead willing students in prayer. 2
Each statute was passed in sequential order. 129 The court of appeals had
found the first and third statutes to be constitutional and unconstitutional,
respectively. 3 ' The second statute, authorizing "meditation or voluntary
prayer" was the only remaining statute considered by the Court.'
121. See, e.g., Croft v. Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 2009). The statute in
Croft expressly allows for prayer. Id.
122. Sherman ex tel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 520 (7th Cir. 2010); Croft v.
Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 750-51 (5th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 282
(4th Cir. 2001); Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1464, 1474 (11th Cir. 1997).
123. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
124. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 252 (3rd Cir. 1985).
125: Wallace, 472 U.S. 38.
126. Id. at41-42.
127. Id. at 42-43.
128. Id. at 40.
129. Id.
130. Id. at41.
131. Id. at41-42.
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The Court applied the Lemon test to the statute and looked specifically at
the first prong to determine if the statute had any secular purpose. 3 2 The
analysis required the Court to look at both the language of the statute and
the "legislative intent of those responsible for its enactment." 3 ' In its
analysis of the text of the statute, the Court noted that the only significant
difference between the statute and its predecessor was the inclusion of the
phrase "or voluntary prayer."'34 It concluded that the addition of the text
was to "characterize prayer as a favored practice."'3 5
The Court also found that there was no secular purpose behind the
enactment of the statute. 36 The State Senator that introduced the bill
expressly admitted that the bill "was an effort to return voluntary prayer to
the public schools."'37 Although the Court noted that a statute was not
required to have "exclusively secular objectives," 13 the Senator confirmed
the lack of any secular purpose when he stated: "No, I did not have any
other purpose in mind."'39 Subsequently, the Court determined that the
purpose behind the text of the statute and the intent of the legislator was
religious in nature-in violation of the First Amendment "4-and declined
to address the second or third prongs of the Lemon test.'4 '
The relevant issue in Wallace was not that the statute was found to be
unconstitutional, but that the Court seemed ready to accept a secular
purpose for the statute if one had been offered. The State presented
absolutely no evidence of a secular purpose and left the Court no other
alternative. 42 Justice Powell, in his concurrence noted that he would have
voted to uphold the statute if "it also had a clear secular purpose."'43 Hence,
the holding in Wallace made it clear that a statute must have a clear secular
purpose, even if there may be a religious component to the statute.
132. Id. at 56.
133. Ralph D. Mawdsley, One Minute of Required Silence in Texas Classrooms: The Fifth
Circuit Upholds the State's Moment of Silence Amendments, 246 EDuc. L. REP. 589, 592
(2009).
134. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59.
135. Id. at 60.
136. Id. at 59-60.
137. Id at 56-57.
138. Id. at 64 (Powell, J., concurring); see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610-
11(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-303
(1963).
139. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 57.
140. Id. at 61.
141. Id. at 60-61.
142. Id. at 57.
143. Id. at 66.
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2. May v. Cooperman
Shortly after Wallace, the Third Circuit considered a challenge to a New
Jersey statute mandating that teachers in public schools allow students one
minute for "quiet and private contemplation or introspection."'" The
statute did not mention prayer in any form; however, several public school
pupils, parents of pupils, and a teacher challenged the statute.14' The
plaintiffs filed a verified complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the
statute was unconstitutional and the district court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the statute prior to it being
implemented. 46
Relying on the recent Wallace decision, the court applied the Lemon test
to analyze the statute.1 47 Because the Third Circuit disagreed with the
reasoning of the district court's Lemon test analysis, the Third Circuit
reversed the order and began with the question of whether the statute
allowed for excessive entanglement of the government and religion. The
district court had decided that the possible divisiveness of the statute
equaled entanglement, 14 but the Third Circuit disagreed, noting that
divisiveness was allowed when government accommodated religion, and
found that there was no excessive entanglement.'49
The Third Circuit also disagreed with the district court's finding that the
primary purpose of the statute was to inhibit or advance religion."' 0 The
district court read the statute as mandatory in that it required students to
either pray or to accommodate those students who chose to pray.' The
district court concluded that the State had consequently advanced
religion.'52 The Third Circuit made an interesting admission by noting that
the district court had determined that "[a] short period of group silence at
the commencement of the day" was a form of prayer for one of the major
religious bodies in New Jersey.'53 The district court then made the
assumption that silence was equal to prayer for most students. 4 The Third
144. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 241 (3d Cir. 1985).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 250.
148. Id. at 247.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 250.
151. Id. at 248.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Circuit, nonetheless, disagreed and determined that accommodation of a
time for silent, voluntary prayer did not inhibit or advance religion. 5 1
Finally, the Third Circuit considered the first Lemon prong and noted the
difficulty of the legislative purpose inquiry.156 The Third Circuit compared
the statute to the statutes in Wallace and determined that it was most like
the statute that was not contested in Wallace since prayer was not
mentioned.' The Third Circuit also noted that, in the abstract, the statute
at bar would not be invalid based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Wallace.158 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit considered the finding of the
district court, in which the district court determined that the only stated
secular purpose of the statute-to provide a transition from non-school life
to school-was a pretext.5 9 The district court relied on the history of other
legislation in the New Jersey legislature and the previous activities of one
co-sponsor of the legislation to reach its conclusion. 16
Subsequently, because the Third Circuit could not say that the finding
was clearly erroneous, it accepted the district court's determination of the
purpose of the legislation. 6' The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court in Wallace specifically required a secular purpose when upholding
the constitutionality of a statute. 62 Since there was no secular purpose that
was not rejected by the district court, the Third Circuit held the New Jersey
Statute to be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 63
The Cooperman analysis, coming so quickly on the heels of the Wallace
decision, has been attacked as too narrowly defining the secular purpose
prong:
The problem with the Cooperman analysis ... is the erroneous
assumption that a literal secular purpose is required. The first
prong of the Lemon test requiring a secular legislative purpose is
an unfortunate shorthand reformulation of the principle that the
statute violates the establishment clause if its purpose is either
the advancement or inhibition of religion. A statute having no
specifically articulated secular purpose, however, does not
necessarily promote or inhibit religion as its purpose. A statute
155. Id. at 250.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 251.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 251-52.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 251.
163. Id. at 253.
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such as the one at issue in Cooperman provides those students
who so desire an opportunity to pray. The statute does not in
that respect have a purely secular purpose. The Supreme Court,
however, has acknowledged that even a silence statute"motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first
criterion" of the Lemon test.'64
Had the court in Cooperman considered that a statute can have a purpose
that is not purely secular and still not violate the purpose prong, the court
may have found that the statute did not violate the First Amendment. The
Third Circuit, however, felt that it was bound by the language in Wallace
mandating a secular purpose.1 65 The Third Circuit did not discuss the
explanation by the Court in Wallace that a statute can be motivated-at
least in part-by a religious purpose and not violate the First
Amendment.166 Had the Third Circuit done so, it is reasonable to think that
the court would have upheld the statute, having found no excessive
entanglement or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. The
message of the court's holding is that a clear secular purpose for a statute is
a necessity, regardless of whether any other religious purposes for the
statute exist. 67
3. Bown v. Gwinnett County School Board
In Bown v. Gwinnett County School Board,168 the Federal Circuits began
to move away from the strict interpretation of Wallace by the Third Circuit
in Cooperman.169 The Georgia State Legislature passed the "Moment of
Quiet Reflection in Schools Act," which mandated that, at the beginning of
each public school day, the teacher shall conduct a "brief period of quiet
reflection for not more than 60 seconds." 70 The Act also specified that the
period of quiet reflection was not to be used as a religious exercise and that
student-led voluntary prayers at school events were not to be prevented as a
result of the Act.' 7' The plaintiff, a teacher in the school system, was
164. Mary Ellen Quinn Johnson, School Prayer and the Constitution: Silence is Golden, 48
MD. L. REv. 1018, 1036 (1989).
165. Coopernan, 780 F.2d at 253.
166. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); see Johnson, supra note 164, at 1036 n.102.
167. Cooperman, 780 F.2d at 253.
168. Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1464 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
169. Id. at 1469. The court acknowledged that a legislative purpose does not have to be
exclusively secular. Id.
170. Id. at 1466.
171. Id. The legislature added the language about student-led prayer out of concern that
the clause disallowing the moment of silence to be used as a religious exercise might be
construed to deny voluntary, student-led prayer at any other time of the day. Id. at 1471.
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opposed to the Act and refused to comply.7 2 He was terminated and
subsequently filed a complaint, alleging that the Act was unconstitutional. 73
The court looked to the Lemon test in its analysis of the Act's
constitutionality. 174 In determining the secular purpose of the Act, the court
noted that the express language of the statute demonstrated the secular
purpose. 7 The text in one subsection expressly stated that the "moment of
quiet reflection ... is not intended to be and shall not be conducted as a
religious service or exercise."1 76 The court also looked to the purpose of the
Act's primary sponsor when he stated that he introduced the bill "as one
way of addressing the problems of violence which Georgia's children
face."'7 7 In looking to the text of the Act and the legislative history, the court
found that the Act had a clearly secular purpose and satisfied the first prong
of the Lemon test. 78
The court continued its analysis and determined that there was no
violation of the second prong: the primary effect of the Act was not to
advance or inhibit religion.'79 It pointed out that the Act "mandates a
moment of quiet reflection not a moment of silent prayer."'80 The court also
noted that there was no government coercion of students to engage in
religious activity,"' and that the State did not create a situation in which
students were pressured, publicly or by peers, to participate. 8 2
Finally, the court determined that there was no excessive entanglement
with religion.8 3 The teachers and students were to remain silent during the
moment of quiet reflection."8 Since the teachers neither participated in nor
monitored the content of any prayers, there could be no excessive
entanglement.'85 In Bown, the court reaffirmed that the clear secular
purpose of a statute is usually the key to its constitutionality.8 6 Both
Wallace and Cooperman turned on the clear secular purpose of the statutes
172. Id. at 1467-68.
173. Id. at 1468.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1469.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1471.
178. Id. at 1472.
179. Id. at 1473.
180. Id. at 1472.
181. Id. at 1473.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1474.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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and the court in Bown held the statute to be constitutional since it had a
secular purpose, even if individual legislators had spoken to a religious
purpose.'87
4. Brown v. Gilmore
In Brown v. Gilmore,'88  the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the
constitutionality of moment of silence statutes, even if the statute expressly
allows silent prayer as one option among others for the prescribed time
limit.'89 The court considered the challenge to a Virginia statute
amendment, which mandated that each school division in the state establish
a "minute of silence." 9' Each student was permitted, "in the exercise of his
or her individual choice, [to] meditate, pray or engage in any other silent
activity which does not interfere with, distract, or impede other pupils in
the like exercise of individual choice."' 9' The court, in the facial challenge to
the statute, looked to the "text, context and legislative history" to determine
if the statute violated the three prongs of the Lemon test. 92
The court initially turned to the first prong of the Lemon test to
determine whether the statute had a secular purpose, noting that the
purpose did not have to be "exclusively secular."'93 Opponents attacked the
statute for expressly allowing a student to pray during the moment of
silence, but the court noted that the text also allowed for any other non-
distracting purpose."' The simple allowance of a voluntary silent prayer was
an accommodation of religion that had a secular purpose.' The Fourth
Circuit found that the statute had dual legitimate purposes-one that was
clearly secular and one that was an accommodation of religion-and could
not "run afoul of the first Lemon prong."'196
The court considered the final two prongs of the Lemon test and quickly
found that the statute violated neither prong.' The court specifically noted
that the statute, on its face, was neutral "between religious and nonreligious
modes of introspection." 9' In allaying accusations that the statute would
187. Id. at 1471-72.
188. Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001).
189. Id. at 281-82.
190. Id. at 270.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 275.
193. Id. at 276 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.6 (1984)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 277.
197. Id. at 277-78.
198. Id.
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lead students to believe that the State was endorsing prayer, the court
dismissed those fears as speculative at best. 99 The court did not allow
speculative fears to strike down a statute that was facially neutral between
religious and nonreligious activity.2 0 The court also found that the statute
did not violate the third prong of the Lemon test-causing state
entanglement with religion.2 1 Any involvement of the State in religion was
negligible and only involved the State in informing students that prayer was
a permissible option during the moment of silence. 2 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the statute permissibly accommodated religion under the
Lemon test,203 and subsequently found that the statute did not run afoul of
the Establishment Clause.20 4 Upon appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the Court allowed the Fourth Circuit's decision to stand, refusing to
issue an injunction and denying certiorari.205
Two interesting factors came out of the decision in Brown. First, the
court held that a statute can expressly state that prayer is an allowable
option during the moment of silence and still be held to be constitutional.2 6
Second, a statute can also have a dual purpose of a secular purpose and an
accommodation of religion ahd not be in violation of the Establishment
Clause.20 ' Both of these decisions are informative as to the academic
freedom acts. The academic freedom acts-expressly disallow any religious
use, so if a statute that does accommodate a religious purpose (among other
purposes) is constitutional, one would expect the academic freedom acts to
follow suit.20 The academic freedom acts also accommodate religion in that
the individual students are free to determine for themselves what to do with
the information from a scientific critique.2 9 The key is that, just as in
Brown, there is no coercion from a teacher as to what the student is to do
199. Id.
200. Id. at 278 ("[Slpeculative fears as to the potential effects of this statute cannot be
used to strike down a statute that on its face is neutral between religious and nonreligious
activity.").
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 282.
205. Brown v. Gilmore, 533 U.S. 1301 (2001) (refusing to issue injunction), cert. denied,
Brown v. Gilmore, 534 U.S. 996 (2001).
206. Brown, 258 F.3d at 276.
207. Id.
208. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
209. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008). The statute does not mention what
inferences the student should draw from the critiques of evolution. Id.
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with the time.2"' The school can do nothing to make the activity one that is
religious. 211
5. Croft v. Governor of Texas
In 2009, the Fifth Circuit considered a similar challenge to an
amendment to a Texas Statute that mandated a moment of silence in public
schools.212 The statute allowed that students, as they chose, could "reflect,
pray, meditate, or engage in any other silent activity that is not likely to
interfere with or distract another student."21 3 The sponsor of the bill
modeled the amendment after the statute in Brown and noted that the
Supreme Court had upheld the Brown statute.24 Nevertheless, the
challengers alleged that the statute was an unconstitutional establishment of
religion, appealing after the district court held that the statute had a secular
purpose and was not an establishment of religion.2 '
The court made relatively short work of the analysis of the statute in
determining that the statute did not violate any prong of the Lemon test.
The court reviewed the history of the moment of silence jurisprudence to
that point, noting that the courts had not found that the challenged statutes
had the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion or fostering
excessive government entanglement with religion in any of the prior
cases. 26 The court in Croft also noted that only two of the cases had found a
lack of a secular purpose,2"' and all of the courts focused on the legislative
purposes of the statute.218
The court examined the three secular purposes that the Governor put
forth for the amendments: fostering patriotism, providing a period for
thoughtful contemplation, and protecting religious freedom.219 The court
210. Brown, 258 F.3d at 281.
211. Id.
212. Croft v. Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 2009); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 25.082(d) (West Supp. 2013).
213. Croft, 562 F.3d at 738.
214. Id. at 739.
215. Id. at 738.
216. Id. at 745.
217. Id. The Court in Wallace overturned the Alabama statute because the state did not
put forth any secular purpose. Id. The court in Cooperman overturned the New Jersey statute
because the district court held that the proffered secular purpose was pretextual, and the
Third Circuit was "compelled to find the statute unconstitutional." Id.; see Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 57 (1985) (finding no secular purpose for statute); May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d
240, 253 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming district court's finding that the statute lacked a secular
purpose).
218. Croft, 562 F.3d at 745.
219. Id. at 746.
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determined that religious freedom protection was not a valid purpose since
that purpose was accomplished by an earlier statute,220 but the court held
that the other two secular purposes were permissible. 2 In reviewing the
legislative history, the court found that the purposes offered for the statute
were consistent with the legislative record, and, even if the purposes of
some individual legislators had been religious, the secular purposes were
still present.222 Consequently, the court concluded that the statute did not
violate the first prong of the Lemon test.223 The court also concluded that the
statute did not violate the second and third prongs of the Lemon test, noting
that the statute neither advanced nor inhibited religion or excessively
entangled the government with religion. 4 As a result, the Fifth Circuit held
that the statute was not an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
Croft reaffirmed that a statute that has a clear secular purpose, even if there
is some non-primary religious motivations, does not violate the
Establishment Clause.226
6. Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch
In Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch,227 the plaintiffs brought a Section
1983 challenge against the Illinois Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act,
which mandated a period of silence in public schools. 22 The Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the district court's decision, holding that Section 1
of the statute did have a secular purpose and did not have the primary effect
of promoting religion.229 The Seventh Circuit also distinguished Wallace, as
relied upon by the challengers, noting that there was no evidence of a
secular purpose in Wallace and that Wallace involved a suspect historical
context, with one statute being passed directly after another to mandate an
increasingly religious purpose.230
220. Id. at 746-47.
221. Id. at 747-48.
222. Id. at 748.
223. Id. at 749.
224. Id. at 749-50.
225. Id. at 750-51.
226. Id. at 750.
227. Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501 (2010).
228. Id. at 504.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 508-09. The court distinguished Wallace by noting that the facts were
significantly different than the case at hand, because Wallace had no evidence of a statute
with a secular purpose. Id. at 508. The court also pointed out that the statute in Wallace had
a unique history because of the context in which it was passed. Id. at 509. The quick
succession in enacting the statutes supported the claim that the purpose of the statute in
question was "to return voluntary prayer to [Alabama's] schools." Id.
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The court found that the statute did not violate the first prong of the
Lemon test, as the State's offered secular purpose-establishing a period of
silence for schoolchildren to calm the students and prepare them for a day
of learning-was supported by the plain language of the statute.21 The
statute expressly forbade the use of the period as any type of religious
exercise and disavowed any religious purpose.232 Statements by the statute's
principal sponsor further supported the finding that the period of silence
was not to be used for religious purposes.233 The court found no violation of
the first Lemon prong due to the clear secular purpose, no evidence of a
sham purpose, and nothing impermissible about the clarification that
students could pray during the moment of silence.3
The court also found that statute did not violate either the second or
third prongs of the Lemon test.235 In examining the statute, the court noted
that the statute did not limit a student's thoughts during the moment of
silence, and therefore, could neither advance nor inhibit religion.236 The
court pointed out that the statute mandated nothing more than a "period of
silence. ' 237 There was no need for schools, teachers, or the students to
become entangled with any questions of religion.23s Consequently, the court
held that none of the prongs of the Lemon test were violated by the statute
and that the statute was constitutional.239
Not surprisingly, these decisions have been attacked by those who believe
that the religious motivations of individual legislators in enacting a moment
of silence statute equates to an Establishment Clause violation. 2" The fact
that legislators wanted to return prayer to school and expressed that desire
during legislative hearings does not negate the fact that other legislators did
not want to use the act for such purposes.241' Even if that were the case, it still
does not negate the secular purpose of the act. The "statute's purpose need
231. Id. at 509.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 520.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 517.
237. Id. at 519.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 520.
240. See Debbie Kaminer, Bringing Organized Prayer In Through the Back Door: How
Moment-of-Silence Legislation for the Public Schools Violates the Establishment Clause, 13
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 267, 296-98 (2002); Larry R. Thaxton, Silence Begets Religion: Bown v.
Gwinnett County School District and the Unconstitutionality of Moments of Silence in Public
Schools, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1399, 1424 (1996).
241. Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1464, 1471-72 (llth Cir. 1997).
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not be exclusively secular." 24 2 A statute is in violation of the Establishment
Clause if it is "entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion."243
Finally, the entire argument is based on the presumption that silence is the
same as organized religion. By its very nature, a voluntary moment of
silence is not organized in the context of the thoughts of the students. The
students are free to consider any thought that they want. Being quiet by no
means puts the students in any type of religious setting or exercise.
A clear pattern can be seen through the moment of silence cases. None of
the courts in the six cases found that the statutes at issue violated the second
or third prongs of the Lemon test.244 There was no advancement or
inhibition of religion and no excessive entanglement of the state with
religion.245 In four of the cases-Bown, Brown, Croft, and Sherman-the
courts held that the statutes did not violate the Establishment Clause, as
there were clear secular purposes for the statutes.246 The court in
Cooperman reversed the lower court's ruling on the second and third prong,
and held the statute to be unconstitutional solely on the basis of the lower
court's finding that there was no secular purpose.2 47 The Wallace Court
found no secular purpose only because the prime sponsor of the bill did not
offer one.248
A statute that is facially neutral to religion and that allows students to
form their own thoughts, with no direction by a teacher as to the contents
of those thoughts, will consistently be held constitutional. It can
accommodate religion, but it cannot mandate it. As long as there is a
secular purpose behind the statute, even an incidental effect on religion or
the religious motive of an individual legislator will not affect the
constitutionality of the statute. The purpose of the statute is determined by
the purpose of the legislative body in enacting that statute. This
Establishment Clause analysis was evident in the moment of silence cases,
and speaks directly to how a court might rule on the academic freedom acts.
242. Id. at 1469 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.6 (1984)).
243. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)).
244. See discussion supra Part II.B.
245. See discussion supra Part II.B.2-6. In all six cases, the courts did not find a violation
of the second or third prongs of the Lemon test.
246. Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 520 (7th Cir. 2010); Croft v.
Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 750-51 (5th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 282
(4th Cir. 2001); Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1464, 1474 (1lth Cir. 1997).
247. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240,253 (1985).
248. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 43 (1985).
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III. ACADEMIC FREEDOM ACTS
As a result of the reversal of educational philosophy from the Scopes trial
to Edwards, teaching evolution became the norm, leaving little allowance
for disagreement with orthodox evolutionary theory.249 A number of
teachers, both at the secondary and post-secondary level, have faced
repercussions for teaching critiques of neo-Darwinism.2"' Subsequently,
multiple state legislatures proposed bills to protect teachers' academic
freedom from any reprisal that might occur as the result of teaching
scientific critiques to evolution.2"' Louisiana and Tennessee have passed
such bills, which have both become law. 252
In 2008, the Louisiana State Legislature passed a bill to allow public
school students to learn about and consider scientific critiques to scientific
controversies. 23 Designed specifically to allow teachers and students to
objectively discuss such controversies as "evolution, the origins of life,
global warming, and human cloning,"254 the Louisiana Science Education
Act ("LSEA") became the first such statute to explicitly protect the scientific
critique of evolution.25 In relevant part, the statute reads as follows:
B. (1) The State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education,
upon request of a city, parish, or other local public school board
shall allow and assist teachers, principals, and other school
administrators to create and foster an environment within public
elementary and secondary schools that promotes critical
thinking skills, logical analysis, and open and objective
discussion of scientific theories being studied including, but not
limited to, evolution, the origins of life, global warming, and
human cloning.
C. A teacher shall teach the material presented in the standard
textbook supplied by the school system and thereafter may use
supplemental textbooks and other instructional materials to help
students understand, analyze, critique, and review scientific
theories in an objective manner, as permitted by the city, parish,
249. See discussion supra Part II.A.
250. Casey Luskin, The Constitutionality and Pedagogical Benefits of Teaching Evolution
Scientifically, 4 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'y 204,232 (2009).
251. Id. at 230.
252. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
253. Luskin, supra note 250, at 245-46.
254. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008).
255. Morelli, supra note 16, at 799-800.
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or other local public school board unless otherwise prohibited by
the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education.
D. This Section shall not be construed to promote any religious
doctrine, promote discrimination for or against a particular set
of religious beliefs, or promote discrimination for or against
religion or nonreligion.21 6
The LSEA does four particular things that allow for academic freedom
without introducing unconstitutional material into the classroom. First, the
LSEA mandates, upon request by a local school board, that the State Board
of Elementary and Secondary Education ("SBESE") assist the school district
to "create and foster an environment" that promotes critical thinking.257
Secondly, the LSEA also states that the discussion must be done in an"objective manner" that remains under the control of the local school
board.2"' Thirdly, any discussion that concerns the scientific critiques must
be done after the standard material in the textbook is taught. Nothing is
being replaced and students are still taught the same school board-approved
scientific material.259 Finally, the statute specifically disallows any alternative
theories that are based on religion.2 60 At no point are the critiques to allow
for religious discussions concerning the origins of life. The statute is
designed to simply allow for critiques of controversial topics in science.
The legislature in the State of Tennessee passed a similar statute in
2012.261 Although the basic framework is similar to the LSEA, there are a
few minor variations that do not impact the purpose of the bill, which is
also to allow exploration of scientific controversies. The relevant portions
state:
(a) The state board of education, public elementary and
secondary school governing authorities, directors of schools,
school system administrators, and public elementary and
secondary school principals and administrators shall endeavor to
create an environment within public elementary and secondary
schools that encourages students to explore scientific questions,
learn about scientific evidence, develop critical thinking skills
and respond appropriately and respectfully to differences of
opinion about scientific subjects required to be taught under the
256. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
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curriculum framework developed by the state board of
education.
(c) Neither the state board of education nor any public
elementary or secondary school governing authority, director of
schools, school system administrators, or any public elementary
or secondary school principal or administrators shall prohibit
any teacher in a public school system of this state from helping
students understand, analyze, critique, and review in an objective
manner the scientific strengths and scientific weaknesses of
existing scientific theories covered in the course being taught
within the curriculum framework developed by the state board of
education.
(d) This section only protects the teaching of scientific
information, and shall not be construed to promote any religious
or nonreligious doctrine, promote discrimination for or against a
particular set of religious beliefs or nonbeliefs, or promote
discrimination for or against religion or nonreligion.262
The Tennessee statute is similar to the LSEA in most ways, but does vary
in some minor points. It is similar in that it seeks to foster "an environment
... to explore scientific questions" and "develop critical thinking skills" in
relation to controversies over scientific subjects.2 63 Nevertheless, it does not
require the request of the local school board and mandates that the State
Board of Education take the step of fostering the environment.2" The
teaching of the controversies must be done within the framework of the
curriculum developed by the State Board, meaning that the standard
information will continue to be taught and that critiques are limited to
existing theories being taught under the framework.2 65 Because the statute is
limited to discussing the strengths and weaknesses of "existing scientific
theories covered in the course," no alternative theories can be introduced."6
Finally, the statute also contains a prohibition against religious discussions
of scientific controversies into the classroom.2 67 As in the LSEA, the
discussions are limited to "scientific questions" based on "scientific
evidence" concerning the controversies.2 68 The one notable difference is that
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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section (c) in the Tennessee statute specifically protects educators from
interference by administrators when teaching the controversies, 269 where
the LSEA implies the protection.27 °
A. Legislative History
1. Louisiana Science Education Act
The examination of the moment of silence cases showed that the court is
very interested in the purpose of the legislature in enacting a statute.
Consequently, in an analysis of the first prong of the Lemon test, the court
will usually inquire into the legislative history to determine whether an
improper motive drove the enactment of the legislation.271 In the case of
both academic freedom acts, the actual purpose and history behind the bills
may be significantly different than what has been asserted, as the media
often portrayed the facts in a manner that implies a particular purpose. That
is certainly the case with the LSEA. The opponents of the LSEA use the facts
to imply a religious motive and intent behind the bill, even though support
from religious groups or legislators would not cause the invalidation of a
secular purpose behind the bill.2 72
What is known about the LSEA is that Ben Nevers, a prominent
Democrat in the Senate, sponsored Louisiana Senate Bill 733 ("SB 733") in
early 2008.273 The Louisiana Family Forum ("LFF"),2 74 a Christian, pro-
family organization in Louisiana, "committed to defending faith, freedom
and the traditional family" also supported SB 733.2.7 Among its other
supporters, SB 733 also counted former Baton Rouge City Court Judge
Darrell White, who openly shared his Christian views on his personal
269. Id.
270. Id. The Tennessee statute states that no authority over a teacher "shall prohibit" the
teaching of the controversies. Id. The Louisiana statute simply states that a teacher "may use"
supplemental materials to teach the controversies. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17: 285.1 (2008).
Hence, the Tennessee statute specifically addresses prohibition by the school authorities
while the Louisiana statute does not.
271. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
272. See, e.g., Forrest, supra note 4; Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]e do not presume that the sole purpose of a law is to advance
religion merely because it was supported strongly by organized religions or by adherents of
particular faiths.").
273. S.B. 733, LA. STATE LEG., available at http://www.legis.la.gov/Legis
/BillInfo.aspx?i=211183 (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
274. Morelli, supra note 16, at 819.
275. LA. FAMILY FORUM, http://www.lafamilyforum.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2014);
Edward J. Larson, Teaching Creation, Evolution, and the New Atheism in 21st Century
America: Window on an Evolving Establishment Clause, 82 Miss. L.J. 997,1032 (2013).
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website and was involved with the LFF.276 Notwithstanding the religious
viewpoints of the supporters, the support of these groups did not inherently
impart any religious purpose to the bill. In fact, Senator Nevers specifically
stated the purpose behind the bill when he explained that SB 733 was"strictly about teaching science in the classroom .... It has nothing to do
with religion."277
Finally, another major fact that is not in contention, but has been
severely misconstrued, is that the LSEA was originally based on a model
Academic Freedom Bill from the Discovery Institute ("DI"),27s with "some
of [the statute's] language" coming from DI's Model Bill.279 What most
opponents attempt to accomplish with statements implying a religious
motive is to manufacture a connection with an alleged "creationist"
organization."' That false allegation is a severe misunderstanding of the
function and purpose of the DI, because intelligent design is not in any way
based on the "creationism" movement.2 1
The fact that the LSEA was based on a model bill is itself non-
noteworthy. Legislatures may craft legislation from a uniform or model
bill.282 What is more important is that the LSEA underwent multiple
276. Morelli, supra note 16, at 819-20.
277. Marcelle Hanemann, Nevers: Science Bill Not About Religion, DAILY NEWS (June 23,
2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.gobogalusa.com/news/article_a195594c-19e5-517e-9b28-
e9d848d93eda.html.
278. Morelli, supra note 16, at 821; About Discovery, DISCOVERY INST.,
http://www.discovery.org/about.php (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) ("Discovery Institute is an
inter-disciplinary community of scholars and policy advocates dedicated to the
reinvigoration of traditional Western principles and institutions and the worldview from
which they issued. Discovery Institute has a special concern for the role that science and
technology play in our culture and how they can advance free markets, illuminate public
policy and support the theistic foundations of the West .... ). The Model Act, from which
the LSEA is significantly altered, can be viewed at
http://www.academicfreedompetition.com/freedom.php (last visited Jan. 8,2014).
279. Morelli, supra note 16, at 821.
280. See, e.g., Forrest, supra note 4.
281. DeWolf, supra note 99, at 19-24. In Kitzmiller, Judge Jones wrongly equated
Intelligent Design ("ID") (of which DI is a proponent) with creationism simply because some
of the supporters of ID held private religious beliefs in God. Id. at 19.
282. UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Frequentlyo2OAsked%20Questions (last
visited Jan. 7, 2014). The Uniform Law Commission also has a Model Act pertaining to
Human Trafficking at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Prevention%20of%620and
%20Remedies%20for%20Human%20Trafficking. It is interesting to note that many religious
groups are involved in the battle against human trafficking. See, e.g., FAITH ALLIANCE
AGAINST SLAVERY & TRAFFICKING, http://www.faastinternational.org/#/about-us/faast-
members (last visited Dec. 17, 2014). It is hard to imagine that the use of a model act in the
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revisions, such that the language of the LSEA differed significantly from the
DI's Model Bill.2s3 The revisions alone are strong evidence that the bill that
became the LSEA shows the purpose behind the legislature in its passage
and not the intent of any one particular legislator. The very fact that
particular terms were added or removed spoke directly to the intent of the
legislature, a common rule of statutory interpretation. 24 After the revision
process, the bill was approved 93-4 in the House and 35-0 in the Senate,
becoming law when enacted by Governor Bobby Jindal on June 25, 2008.25
2. Tennessee Academic Freedom Act
The Tennessee statute is even less controversial in its enactment than the
LSEA. Tennessee Senator Bo Watson introduced SB 0893 in the State
Senate and Representative Bill Dunn introduced HB 0368 in the State
House.2 6 Both bills were eventually combined into HB 0368 and ultimately
enacted after Governor Bill Haslam opted neither to sign nor veto it.2 7 The
bill became law on April 10, 2012, enjoying bipartisan support after passing
the Senate 25-828" and the House 72-23.2s9
As was the case with the LSEA, opponents and proponents of the bills
both voiced their opinions of the bill to the legislature. A few Tennessee
members of the National Academy of Science signed a letter in opposition
to the bill.290 Other opponents included a local high school teacher291 and a
enactment of human trafficking legislation would engender the same level of opposition as a
result of support by religious organizations.
283. Larson, supra note 275, at 1032 (noting that there was significant revision to the bill
during the committee phase and prior to enactment).
284. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740 (2001) (noting that a particular term was
omitted by Congress in a statute and the "fair inference" was that Congress intentionally left
that term out).
285. S.B. 733, LA. STATE LEG., http://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=211183 (last
visited Jan. 7, 2014).
286. TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?BiUNumber=SB893&ga= 107 (last
visited Dec. 17, 2014).
287. Larson, supra note 275, at 1035.
288. TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Bfilinfo/BilVotesArchive.aspx?ChamberVoting=S
&BillNumber=SB0893&ga=107 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
289. TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/BillVotesArchive.aspx?Chamber
Voting=H&BillNumber=HB0368&ga=107 (last visited Jan. 8,2014).
290. Chas Sisk, Debate Over Evolution Now Allowed in Tenn. Schools, USA TODAY (Apr.
11, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-O4-11/evolution-
creationism-debate-tennessee-law/54174242/1.
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geology professor from Vanderbilt. 292 Proponents of the bill were equally
credentialed, including a local high school biology teacher,293 a Ph.D. from
Rutgers,294 and a number of Ph.D.'s that signed a letter in support of the
bill.295
Despite the lack of a substantial link to religious groups, the opposition
to the bill centered the attacks on mischaracterizations of the purpose of the
bill. The media routinely referred to the bill as allowing "creationism" in the
classroom,296 which the bill specifically did not allow. 297 The purpose of the
bill, as stated by Representative Dunn, was about "objective scientific
facts." 29' The lack of a direct connection to any religious group left
opponents with misrepresentations of the bill and attempts to discern
religious intent from the demeanor of the bill's sponsor while answering
questions. 299 As with the LSEA, the opponents of the Tennessee bill argued
291. See Senate-Education, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Mar. 30, 2011, 01:16:39),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=196&clipid=3912&metaid= 71412
(video clip of Wesley H. Roberts, local high school teacher, speaking against Senate Bill 0893.
Mr. Roberts, however, conceded that "scientific evidence against evolution" should be
"heard.").
292. See House-Education, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Mar. 29, 2011, 00:43:15),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewjid=196&clipjid=3899 (video clip of Molly
Miller, geology professor speaking against House Bill 0368).
293. Senate-Education, supra note 291, (Mar. 30, 2011, 01:09:00) (video clip of Harold
Morrison, a local high school biology teacher, discussing the need to allow questioning of
evolution).
294. Id. at 01:04:45 (Robin Zimmer, a PhD from Rutgers, notes that the bill will improve
science education).
295. Letter to Governor Bill Haslam, http://www.evolutionnews.org/TN-Letter_2012.pdf
(last visited July 22, 2014).
296. See Sisk, supra note 290; see also David Zucchino, Creationism Discussions Are Now
OK in TN Schools, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/11 /nation/la-na-nn-tennessee-creationism-classroom-
20120411.
297. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012) (specifically limiting the discussion to
the curriculum "taught under the curriculum framework."). The author of the bill in the
Senate also specifically stated that no subject matter outside the curriculum can be brought
in. Senate-Education, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Mar. 14, 2012 00:53:30),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id= 196&clip_id=5146&meta_id=95335
(video clip of Senator Watson discussing the purpose of the bill).
298. Kari Huus, Activists Cry Foul as Tenn. Science Education Bill Hits Governor's Desk,
NBC NEWS, (Apr. 5, 2012, 2:30 PM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/-news/20 12/04/05/1 1040270-activists-cry-foul-as-tenn-science-
education-bill-hits -governors-desk?lite.
299. Charles Cowan, Creationism's Public and Private Fronts: The Protection and
Restriction of Religious Freedom, 82 MISS. L.J. 223, 238-39 (2013) (referring to Rep. Dunn's
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that the true purpose of the bill was not facially recognizable. 00
Nonetheless, the correct inquiry is the intent of the legislature, which passed
the bill with strong majorities. There is nothing to indicate that the
legislature had a religious purpose in passing the bill.
B. Opponents'Arguments Against the Louisiana and Tennessee Statutes
Although the purpose of this Comment is to show that both of the
academic freedom acts are constitutionally sound, it is also instructive to
note the criticisms surrounding both statutes. The arguments from the
opposition in both states were essentially the same, except for a claim that
the Tennessee bill would hurt the economy.3 1 During the enactment of the
LSEA one opponent went as far as issuing talking points,3 2 which contained
the other major arguments used in opposition to the LSEA: (1) there is no
need for such a bill since teachers already have academic freedom, (2) there
is no existing controversy over evolution in the scientific field, and (3) the
Academic Freedom Act is nothing but an attempt to teach creationism in
the classroom. 3
1. Teachers Already Have Academic Freedom
Opponents of the Acts made the argument that teachers already have the
academic freedom to teach scientific critiques in both Tennessee and
Louisiana as a reason to not pass the bills. That argument simply
understated the problem. While school educational standards may facially
allow the scientific critique of controversies, that is not always the case in
practice.30 4 Teachers in public schools have been removed from teaching
biology simply by introducing evidence of controversies with neo-
Darwinism." 5 The lack of protection has also caused problems on a public
university campus, where a professor was asked to step down simply for
giving a lecture on evolution and critical thinking.3 °6
answers to questions about whether the bill would allow the teaching of "creationism" to
show a possibility of that occurrence).
300. Sisk, supra note 290 (Barry Lynn states that the bill was presented as giving
flexibility to teachers, but that the bill is actually about evolution).
301. See House-Education, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Mar. 29, 2011, 00:43:15),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=196&clip-id=3899. (video of Molly
Miller arguing that the proposed bill would hurt Tennessee's economy).
302. Forrest, supra note 4.
303. Id.
304. Luskin, supra note 250, at 232.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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2. There is No Existing Controversy Over Evolution
The next argument asserts that all scientists are in agreement concerning
evolution and, therefore, there is nothing to critique. It leaves no room for
dissent among the members of the scientific community. Nevertheless, the
argument fails from a lack of attention to the number of equally
credentialed scientists that differ on the validity of neo-Darwinism. A group
of eighty-five scientists submitted an amicus brief during the Kitzmiller trial
urging the court not to "usurp the laboratory or scientific journals as the
venue where scientific disputes are resolved."307 Among that group were
both a Professor of Biology and Molecular Biology at the University of
Georgia and a Professor of Biology at San Francisco State University.3"'
In addition, numerous Ph.D.'s have signed their names to a list stating
their dissent from neo-Darwinism.3 °9 To be included on the list, the signer
must agree to the statement: "We are skeptical of claims for the ability of
random mutation and natural selection to account for the complexity of life
.... "3 0 The signers must also "hold a Ph.D. in a scientific field such as
biology, chemistry, mathematics, engineering, computer science, or one of
the other natural sciences; or they must hold an M.D. and serve as a
professor of medicine."' To argue that there are no equally credentialed
and qualified scientists that disagree with evolution is willful ignorance of
the facts. A legitimate controversy concerning evolution exists regardless of
the current dominance of Darwinian evolution as the leading theory of
human origins.
3. The Academic Freedom Acts Are an Attempt to Teach Creationism
The argument that proponents of the bill are simply attempting to
introduce creationism into the classroom is a severe mischaracterization of
the language of the statuies. The opponents use this argument to find ties to
religion and make the issue an Establishment Clause question.312 Neither
307. Brief for Amici Curiae Biologists & Other Scientists in Support of Defendants,
Kitzmifler v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005), 2005 WL 3136712
(see "Selected List of Amici Curae").
308. Id. at 3.
309. A Scientiic Dissent from Darwinism, DISSENTFROMDARWIN.ORG,
http://www.dissentfromdarwin.org (follow "Download The List" hyperlink) (last visited Jan.
18, 2014).
310. FAQ-Dissent from Darwin, DISSENTFROMDARWIN.ORG, http://www.dissentfromdarwin
.org/faq.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
311. Id.
312. Forrest, supra note 4. The author's "talking points" use the term "creationism" (or
some derivation) fourteen times in the two page document. Id. The author also claims that
"[t]his bill will allow the teaching of creationism, which is a religious belief." Id.
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statute is about religion (or creationism). In fact, both statutes explicitly
deny protection to any teacher who may attempt to bring in a religious
belief under the statutes.313
It is a large assumption to equate the critique of scientific controversies
with religion. It is true that there may be some teachers that wish to teach
creationism. These statutes, however, will not allow any religious doctrine
to be taught. DeWolf points this out when he states:
[A teacher attempting to teach creationism] does not mean that
scientific critique of neo-Darwinism necessarily conceals a
religious motive, if indeed motive is even germane to deciding
the scientific legitimacy of this critique. In any case, the
pedagogical issue is not the motive of the critics, but the
existence of specifically empirical critique of neo-Darwinian and
chemical evolutionary theory that textbooks do not report to
students.... This hardly seems to constitute either 'religious' or'unscientific' activity. 14
Turning the scientific critique of neo-Darwinism into religion is simply an
attempt to use the Establishment Clause to bully teachers into silence.31
No critique is tantamount to religion, especially in light of the fact that
there is no agreed upon definition or test for what constitutes religion. The
courts have generally recognized that "religion" is a "term [that] is found in
the history of the human race and is incapable of compression into a few
words."316 There is no agreed upon definition of what constitutes religion,
313. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17: 285.1(D) (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West
2012). Both statutes have a clause that specifically states that the statute does not permit the
promotion of any religious doctrine. The Louisiana statute states: "This Section shall not be
construed to promote any religious doctrine, promote discrimination for or against a
particular set of religious beliefs, or promote discrimination for or against religion or
nonreligion." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17: 285.1(D) (2008). The Tennessee statute states: "This
section only protects the teaching of scientific information, and shall not be construed to
promote any religious or nonreligious doctrine, promote discrimination for or against a
particular set of religious beliefs or nonbeliefs, or promote discrimination for or against
religion or nonreligion." TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
314. David K. DeWolf, Stephen C. Meyer & Mark Edward DeForrest, Teaching the
Origins Controversy: Science, or Religion or Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 39, 57 (emphasis
added).
315. Id. The authors also note that "[b]y stigmatizing critique as either 'unscientific' or
'religious,' advocates for the exclusive presentation of neo-Darwinism discourage teachers
from teaching students what scientists actually know and report in their technical journals,
and encourage instead the presentation of a simplistic caricature of scientific method and the
origins controversy." Id.
316. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
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which makes an Establishment Clause violation difficult to ascertain.
Notwithstanding the lack of consensus, the Ninth Circuit did employ a
three-part test to determine if a religion existed in Alvarado v. City of San
Jose."' The court relied on the tripartite test to determine that a publicly
funded statue of the Aztec religious figure Quetzalcoatl did not violate the
Establishment Clause.31 The test stated:
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions
having to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a
religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system
as opposed to an isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be
recognized by the presence of certain formal and external
signs.319
By the Ninth Circuit's test, the critique of neo-Darwinism cannot be a
religion. First, while a critique may deal with "fundamental and ultimate
questions,"3"' it does not any more so than evolutionary theory. Both
evolution and any subsequent critiques speak to the issue of how life
originated. Second, there is no belief system espoused in scientifically
critiquing evolution. Finally, there are no "formal and external signs,"32'
which the court defined as "formal services, ceremonial functions, the
existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation,
observance of holidays and other similar manifestations associated with the
traditional religions. 322
Scientific critique of evolution is not religion, despite how vociferous the
opponents of the statute may be in attempting to conflate the two. The
statute explicitly prohibits the advocacy of religion and therefore cannot be
used to sneak creationism into the classroom. The academic freedom acts
simply and expressly prohibit religious doctrines and would therefore not
allow creationism.323
317. Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996).
318. Id. at 1230; DeWolf, supra note 314, at 85.
319. Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1229.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
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4. The Academic Freedom Act Will Hurt the Economy
The final argument was made during the hearing for the Tennessee
statute.3 24 The professor from Vanderbilt claimed that the passage of the bill
would hurt Tennessee's economy because scientific groups and
organizations would either leave the state or refuse to come.3 25 The
professor referred to a scientific group that opted not to have its conference
in Louisiana after the passage of the LSEA and claimed that the group's
decision was based on a protest of the LSEA's enactment.3 26
The truth, however, is that there is no evidence that the passage of the
LSEA has negatively affected the science and technology sector in
Louisiana.3 27 In fact, the fields have actually grown.3 2 Louisiana, after
multiple disasters, has discovered that "[b]ioscience is thriving in New
Orleans. 3 29 That was in 2009, which was a year after the LSEA was enacted.
While there is evidence that one group refused to come to Louisiana-
simply out of protest against a law-the state has seen growth in the
scientific sector, hardly a hit to the economy.33 °
All four of the major arguments against the statutes do not hold up in
light of scrutiny of the actual text of the statute. Nevertheless, the ultimate
test of the statute is not whether mischaracterizations of the statutes are
easily rebutted, but how a court would determine the constitutionality of
the statutes.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM ACTS
The ultimate question of whether the academic freedom acts pass
constitutional muster lies in the Establishment Clause analysis by the court
if such a claim were brought against them. As is generally the rule with
Establishment Clause analysis, the court would analyze the statute under
324. See House Education, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Mar. 29, 2011, 00:43:15),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=196&clip-id=3899. (video of Miller
arguing that the proposed bill would hurt Tennessee's economy).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Amanda Mascarelli, All Jazzed Up, 486 NATURE MAG. 429, 429 (June 21, 2012),
available at http://www.nature.com/naturejobs/science/articles/10.1038/nj7403-429a.
328. Id.
329. Mascarelli, supra note 327; Casey Luskin, Nature Admits "Bioscience Is Thriving" in
Louisiana, Blows Up Darwin Lobby Talking Point, WWW.EVOLUTIONNEWS.ORG, (June 25, 2012
6:17 PM), http://www.evolutionnews.org/2012/06/natureadmits b_1061351.html.
330. Mascarelli, supra note 327, at 429.
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the Lemon test and perhaps the endorsement test.3 ' Both the academic
freedom acts and the moment of silence statutes contain multiple
similarities. 2 A comparison of the academic freedom acts to the moment
of silence statutes, and their constitutionality, shows that the academic
freedom acts should survive an Establishment Clause challenge.
A. Similarities Between Moment of Silence Statutes and Academic Freedom
Acts
There are numerous similarities between both statutes that are
instructive as to how the courts would examine the academic freedom acts
in light of the Lemon test and/or the endorsement test. The courts held that
four of the six moment of silence statutes were constitutional,333 and the
statute in Wallace failed the first prong of the Lemon test solely because the
State would offer no secular purpose for the statute. 34 The court in Wallace
even noted that "merely protecting every, student's right to engage in
voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence" was quite
different than the statute at hand. 35 The statute in Cooperman failed the
first prong of the Lemon test, not due to a determination by the Third
Circuit, but because the Third Circuit could not find that a finding by the
district court of the lack of secular purpose for the statute was clearly
erroneous. 336 Hence, courts strongly supported the moment of silence
statutes that have a clear secular purpose and those statutes are instructive
in regard to the academic freedom acts.
The first and arguably most important similarity is that both statutes are
neutral as to religion, on their face and as applied.337 The moment of silence
statutes do not promote any activity during the period of silence other than
being silent. 3 s Although some of the statutes expressly include prayer in the
lists of allowed activities, the inclusion is simply an accommodation of
331. See Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburg Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
630 (1989); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
332. See discussion supra Part III.A.
333. See discussion supra Part IIB.
334. Id.
335. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985).
336. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 252 (3rd Cir. 1985).
337. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012);
see, e.g., Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2010) ("This period
shall not be conducted as a religious exercise.").
338. See, e.g., Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1473 (11th Cir. 1997)
("All students may use the moment of quiet reflection as they wish, so long as they remain
silent.").
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religion and not a mandate. 39 The moment of silence statutes do not
advocate for, nor discourage, any type of religious activity during the
period, as long as the activity is silent. 4° The same is true for the academic
freedom acts, which do not advocate for, nor discourage, religion.34'
Nothing in the text of the statutes, or in the method in which a teacher is to
apply the statutes, allows for approval or disapproval of a religious result.342
In fact, both academic freedom acts expressly prohibit a religious exercise.343
Secondly, neither statute mandates any particular conclusion or thought
on the part of the student.3" The moment of silence statutes do not require
any particular thought from the student just as the academic freedom acts
do not direct what the student is to conclude from the scientific critiques.345
Thirdly, both statutes have no more than incidental effects on religion.346
Any effects that might be construed as religious are not because of the text
of the statutes or their application, but because both statutes may happen to"coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." '347
Finally, the statutes in Bown, Brown, and Sherman each have religious
disclaimers expressly prohibiting the moment of silence from being used as
a religious exercise.34 Both of the academic freedom acts contain a similar
339. Sherman, 623 F.3d at 504 ("the Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act."); Croft v.
Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 2009) (allowing a student to "reflect, pray,
meditate, or engage in any other silent activity."); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 270 (4th
Cir. 2001) (allowing students to "meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity.").
340. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240,243-44 (3d Cir. 1985).
341. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
342. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030; see supra note
313.
343. See discussion supra Part III.
344. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
Neither statute mandates what conclusions the students are to draw from the critiques that
are taught.
345. See supra text accompanying note 344; see, e.g., Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
112 F.3d 1464, 1466 (11th Cir. 1997). There is no indication in the statute of what effect the
student should experience from the moment of silence. Id.
346. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1473. The court acknowledges that any effects on religion would
only be secondary and not primary. Id.; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012). Because both statutes expressly prohibit a religious use, any
effect on religion can only be incidental.
347. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (holding that a statute is not
unconstitutional simply because it may line up with the tenets of any or all religions).
348. Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2010) ("This period
shall not be conducted as a religious exercise."); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 270 (4th
Cir. 2001) ("This time is not intended to be and shall not be conducted as a religious service
or exercise."); Bown, 112 F.3d at 1469 ("[A] moment of quiet reflection.., is not intended to
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religious disclaimer.349 The academic freedom acts expressly forbid religious
use and do not protect any attempt by a teacher to use the statute for a
religious purpose."
One of the obvious differences lends even greater support for the
constitutionality of the academic freedom acts. The moment of silence
statutes all allow for prayer in some manner or another. The statutes in
Brown, Croft, and Sherman each expressly allow for prayer while the others
accommodate it.3"' The academic freedom acts, on the other hand,
specifically do not allow any religious activity as a result of the scientific
critiques.352 If the courts held that the moment of silence statutes were
constitutional, while expressly or implicitly allowing for prayer, then the
specific prohibition of any religious activity in the academic freedom acts
should place those statutes in even less danger of running afoul of the
Establishment Clause.
B. Lemon Test Analysis of the Academic Freedom Acts
The touchstone test for a challenge to the Establishment Clause is the
Lemon test.353 The court will look to the three prongs to determine if the
statute: (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a principal or primary purpose
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) does not result in an
excessive entanglement of government with religion.354 Any examination of
the academic freedom acts will necessitate a Lemon test analysis.
be and shall not be conducted as a religious service or exercise." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
349. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17: 285.1 (2008) ("This Section shall not be construed to
promote any religious doctrine, promote discrimination for or against a particular set of
religious beliefs, or promote discrimination for or against religion or nonreligion.'); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012) ("The section only protects the teaching of scientific
information, and shall not be construed to promote any religious or nonreligious doctrine,
promote discrimination for or against a particular set of religious beliefs or nonbeliefs, or
promote discrimination for or against religion or nonreligion.").
350. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
Both statues contain clauses that expressly disallow religious use of the critiques.
351. Sherman, 623 F.3d at 504 ("the Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act."); Croft v.
Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 2009) (allowing a student to "reflect, pray,
meditate, or engage in any other silent activity."); Brown, 258 F.3d at 270 (allowing students
to "meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity.").
352. See discussion supra Part III.
353. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
38 (1985). The Lemon test contains "well-established" criteria for determining the
constitutionality of a statute. Id.
354. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
2015]
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1. The Academic Freedom Acts Have a Secular Purpose
The purpose of the statute is the main focus of the first Lemon prong in
an Establishment Clause challenge."' Both of the moment of silence statutes
that the courts found to be unconstitutional were overturned for failure to
evince a clear secular purpose.356 Hence, the secular purpose of the
academic freedom acts is essential to its constitutionality according to the
Lemon test. The statutes must have a secular purpose, but that purpose does
not have to be exclusively secular. 7 The Constitution allows for a religious
purpose behind a statute as long as there is a predominantly secular
purpose.35 ' In addition, the court presumes that the legislature is not acting
with a religious purpose.359 Even if the legislative purpose behind the
academic freedom acts had a religious component, that component would
not necessarily disqualify the statute.360 The state can still show that there is
a secular purpose.6 Like some of the moment of silence statutes, the
academic freedom acts expressly state that the statute does not have a
religious purpose. 62 The court in Bown found that particular disclaimer to
be sufficient evidence that the moment of silence statute did not have a
religious purpose.363
Even if the individual legislators had any type of religious motive, the
purpose of any one individual legislator is not imputed to the entire
legislature.36 The court in Bown noted that during hearings on the bill,
there were several legislators that wanted to revive school prayer through
the bill.365 The court stated that "what is relevant is the legislative purpose of
the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted
the law."366 The same is true for the academic freedom acts. There have been
accusations that the purposes of the groups supporting the bill were
355. Id. at 612.
356. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56; May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240,253 (3rd Cir. 1985).
357. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.6 (1984); Bown v.
Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).
358. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring).
359. Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501,507 (7th Cir. 2010).
360. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56.
361. Id. at 55-56.
362. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
363. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1469.
364. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 86-87 (Burger, J., dissenting) (explaining that the "sole
relevance of the sponsor's statements ... is that they reflect the personal, subjective motives
of a single legislator.").
365. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1467.
366. Id. at 1471-72.
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religious in nature.367 Even if these accusations are true, the motives of
individual legislators are secondary at most. The court must look to the
purpose of the entire legislature in the enactment of the statute.
The court needs to look no farther than the text of the academic freedom
acts. The court should be "reluctant to attribute unconstitutional motives to
the states, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the state's
program may be discerned from the face of the statute."368 The court also
has "no license to psychoanalyze the legislators."369 Both academic freedom
acts specifically disavow any religious purpose,37 ° and that non-religious
purpose is supported by the respective legislative histories.37" ' In both Brown
and Sherman, the bills' sponsors specifically disavowed any religious
purpose for the bills.372 The same is true for both of the academic freedom
acts. In Louisiana, Senator Nevers stated that the bill was not about
religion. 3 In Tennessee, Representative Dunn noted that the bill was about"objective scientific facts," 74 with no support for any "religious faiths or
dogmas." '375
Finally, there is a strong secular pedagogical purpose for the Academic
Freedom Acts-to foster critical thinking. Justice O'Connor noted in
Wallace that if there is a secular pedagogical purpose to a moment of silence
statute, then the statute should be found unconstitutional only if the text of
the statute, its legislative history, or its application suggests that the statute
has a primary purpose of endorsing prayer.376 The moment of silence
statutes each provided the student with a secular pedagogical purpose.377
Similarly, the legislatures of Tennessee and Louisiana enacted the academic
367. See supra Part III.A.
368. Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 510 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
369. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
370. See supra note 350.
371. See supra Part III.A.
372. Sherman, 623 F.3d at 508-09; Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir. 2001).
373. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
375. Cowan, supra note 299, at 238.
376. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985).
377. Sherman, 623 F.3d at 509 (noting that the pedagogical purpose was to "calm the
students and prepare them for a day of learning."); Croft v. Governor of Texas, 562 F.3d 735,
741 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that the pedagogical purpose was to "establish a contemplative
period that underscores the seriousness of the education endeavor."); Brown, 258 F.3d at 277
(noting that the pedagogical purpose was to allow students "to pause, settle down, compose
themselves and focus on the day ahead."); Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464,
1469 (11 th Cir. 1997) (noting that the pedagogical purpose was to allow a "brief period of
quiet reflection.").
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freedom acts for the purpose of fostering critical thinking skills in students.
The LSEA states that the purpose of the Act is to "promote critical thinking
skills, logical analysis, and open and objective discussion of scientific
theories."37s The Tennessee Act encourages "students to explore scientific
questions, learn about scientific evidence [and] develop critical thinking
skills."379 Both statutes foster a key pedagogical goal for the school system by
encouraging students to think critically in the area of scientific
controversies.
This secular purpose in the academic freedom acts is a strong indicator
that the statutes are likely to pass the first prong of the Lemon test. The
statutes are facially rieutral to any religious activity and there is no evidence
that the legislatures had any religious motives in the adoption of the
academic freedom acts. Even if individual legislators had religious purposes,
the legislatures as a whole did not. The strong secular purpose and lack of
religious intent by the legislatures are indicative of the constitutionality of
the statutes.3"'
2. The Primary Effect of Academic Freedom Acts Neither Advances
Nor Inhibits Religion
The second prong of the Lemon test looks to whether the primary effect
of the statute is to advance or inhibit religion."8 In essence, the court asks
whether the statute conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. 2
The question is not whether there are any effects from the statute, but
whether the advancement or inhibition of religion is the primary effect.383 A
consistent point "in Establishment Clause jurisprudence during the last
half-century has been that incidental harmonies with religious beliefs do
not disqualify secular concepts under the First Amendment.""3 4 The
Establishment Clause will not ban a regulation simply because it happens to
align with the beliefs of a particular religion.385 The statute simply cannot
378. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008).
379. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012).
380. Morelli, supra note 16, at 828. Morelli notes that the purposes are found to be both
secular and legitimate. Hence, he concludes that the statutes are likely to pass the first prong
of the Lemon test. Id.
381. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612 (1971).
382. Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 517 (7th Cir. 2010).
383. DeWolf, supra note 99, at 48.
384. DeWolf, supra note 314, at 89-90. The author notes multiple cases that hold that
secondary effects on religion as a result of the statute are allowable. Id. at n.261; Edwards v.
Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 605 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 319 (1982)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984).
385. DeWolf, supra note 99, at 46; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
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have a primary effect that advances or inhibits religion, nor can the statute
endorse religion." 6
Any effects upon religion that result'from academic freedom acts will, by
nature, only be secondary. The statutes are facially neutral and are to be
applied in a religiously neutral manner. Any attempt by a teacher to use a
scientific critique as a religious exercise will not be protected under the
statutes since the statutes expressly forbid a religious use.3"7 As the court in
Sherman noted, any attempt by a teacher to use the statute in a manner to
promote or discourage religion would "be another case."3"' The primary
effect of the statute will be an objective critique of scientific controversies.3 9
Any effects that may occur as the result of the application by a student of
those critiques can only be secondary, if they even align with a particular
religious belief.
There is also no coercion on the students to come to any particular
conclusion.39° Just as the moment of silence statutes did not coerce students
to participate in any religious activity,39" ' the academic freedom acts simply
permit the teachers to introduce critiques of scientific controversies in an
objective manner.392 The students are not directed to apply those critiques
in any particular manner, so there can be no coercion. The statute expressly
forbids any coercion by an individual teacher to direct those critiques
toward a religious view.393
It is instructive to note that none of the courts found the moment of
silence statutes to be in violation of the second prong of the Lemon test.394
The court in Wallace did not reach that prong because the statute failed the
secular purpose prong.395 The courts in the other five moment of silence
cases, including Cooperman, examined the statutes and found that they did
386. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612 (1971).
387. Luskin, supra note 112, at 61-62.
388. Sherman, 623 F.3d at 517.
389. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012). The statute allows teachers to
help students "to explore scientific questions, learn about scientific evidence, develop critical
thinking skills, and respond appropriately and respectfully to differences of opinion about
scientific subjects." Id.
390. See supra note 346.
391. Croft v. Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting the statement by
the bill's sponsor that the bill "doesn't direct any activity."); Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch.
Dist. 112 F.3d 1464, 1473 (11th Cir. 1997) ("We also note that this case does not involve
impermissible government coercion of students to engage in religious activity.").
392. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008) ("[Iln an objective manner ... "); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012) ("[In an objective manner .....
393. See supra note 346.
394. See discussion supra Part II.B; see also Croft, 562 F.3d at 745.
395. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,56 (1985).
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not violate the second prong of the Lemon test.396 The same should be true
for the academic freedom acts. The academic freedom acts expressly forbid
the use of the statute in a manner that would have a primary effect of
advancing religion, with any secondary effects being permissible.397 They
also do not coerce the students into any religious activity, nor do they
endorse any religious activity.39 The student is free to use the critique as he
or she pleases, and as a result, the academic freedom acts should not be
found to be in violation of the second Lemon prong.
3. The Academic Freedom Acts Do Not Excessively Entangle the
Government with Religion
The third prong of the Lemon test examines whether the statute has the
effect of excessively entangling the government with religion.399 It should be
noted here that the Lemon test does not prohibit any government
entanglement with religion, but qualifies that the entanglement cannot be"excessive."400 In the second prong, some effects of religion are allowed; in
the third prong, some entanglement would be permitted. 0 1 The
entanglement just cannot be excessive. 2
Just as none of the courts in the moment of silence cases found a
violation of the third Lemon prong, there is no reason that academic
freedom acts should be in violation.4 3 The court in Sherman concluded that
the statute only mandated "a period of silence and thus there [was] no need
for schools, teachers, or students to become entangled in questions of
religion."4" The same is true for the academic freedom acts. The teachers
are exclusively allowed to teach objective critiques of scientific
controversies. There is no need for the teachers to be involved in questions
of religion.
One critic argues that the LSEA allows the teachers to bring in
supplemental textbooks and other instructional materials to assist in the
scientific critiques.4 5 The statute allows supplemental textbooks, but those
texts are limited to those approved by the local School Board unless
396. See discussion supra Part II.B.
397. See supra note 351.
398. See supra note 346.
399. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. See discussion supra Part ll.B.
404. Sherman, 623 F.3d at 519.
405. Morelli, supra note 16, at 828.
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prohibited by the State.40 6 The Tennessee statute does not even allow that
much freedom, stating that teachers can only objectively critique
controversies being taught "within the curriculum framework developed by
the state board of education."4 7  But this argument concerning
entanglement narrowly focuses on only one type of teacher-the science
teacher. Just about every teacher can bring in supplemental texts within
reason.
The academic freedom acts expressly prohibit the use of the scientific
critiques for any religious purpose.40 ' There should be no reason for the
government to become entangled with a science teacher to any extent
greater than it is involved with any other type of teacher. Those fears are
simply speculative, and as the court noted in Brown, "speculative fears as to
the potential effects of this statute cannot be used to strike down a statute
that on its face is neutral between religious and nonreligious activity. 4 .9
Constitutional adjudication is the ability to "distinguish between real threat
and mere shadow." 10 Those shadows of what might happen do not
necessitate any excessive government entanglement with religion. The
academic freedom acts should not be found in violation of the third Lemon
prong.
C. Endorsement Test Analysis of Academic Freedom Acts
None of the courts in the moment of silence cases applied Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test to decide the cases. 1' Nevertheless, the
endorsement test has been used in other Establishment Clause cases, so a
possibility exists that a court might apply the test to an academic freedom
act challenge.412 The test is the outlier as to whether a court would find the
academic freedom acts to be constitutional. The test involves the court
examining "whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive [the
statute] as a state endorsement. . ". ." ' Facially, the academic freedom acts
easily meet this standard. The texts of the statutes are religiously neutral;
406. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008).
407. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1030 (West 2012) (emphasis added).
408. See supra note 351.
409. Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 278 (4th Cir. 2001).
410. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 90 (1985) (Burger, J., dissenting).
411. See discussion supra Part II.B. A review of the cases shows that no court in any of the
six cases analyzed the moment of silence statutes using the endorsement test.
412. See, e.g., Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburg Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 630 (1989).
413. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76.
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there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the legislatures of
either states were motivated by a religious motive, and the statutes are
written for a narrow implementation that includes only scientific, objective
critiques of scientific controversies. Justice O'Connor noted that a "moment
of silence law that is clearly drafted and implemented so as to permit prayer,
meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period, without endorsing
one alternative over the others, should pass this test."414 The same truth
applies to the academic freedom acts.
The major problem with the endorsement test lies in the ambiguity of the
"reasonable observer." There is no discernible standard as to the level of
knowledge that is attributable to the reasonable observer.415 While a full
critique of the endorsement test is outside the scope of this Comment, the
ambiguous nature of the reasonable observer presents a large problem to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In essence, "[t]he outcome of any
constitutional case judged under the endorsement/objective observer
analysis can be changed by simply altering the characteristics of the
observer." '416 What that means to the academic freedom acts is that a judge
has the discretion to burden the objective observer with so much extraneous
(and unrelated) knowledge so that the observer can only observe
endorsement. A prime example of that burdening is seen in Kitzmiller.4"7
The Judge determined that the reasonable observer was aware of the court
decisions involving evolution and creationism and (wrongly) attributed that
knowledge to the observer, connecting the creationism debate to intelligent
design. i The observer was left with no alternative other than to find
endorsement.4"9 Not a single court, however, utilized the endorsement test
in determining the moment of silence cases.42° Even though other school
prayer cases were brought prior to those discussed in this Comment, the
history of prayer in school cases was not attributed to any objective
observer.42' The challenges were determined with the present
414. Id.
415. Jesse H. Chopper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL.
499,511 (2002).
416. Id. at 513-14.
417. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714-46 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(analyzing the School Board policy using the endorsement test).
418. See supra note 69.
419. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 746.
420. See discussion supra Part II.B. A review of the cases shows that no court utilized the
endorsement test in the court's analysis.
421. Id. A review of the cases shows that no court attributed any prior school prayer
history to a reasonable observer.
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information.422 It should be the same for the academic freedom acts. The
academic freedom acts have no religious purpose, but given that evolution
is one of the topics that can be critiqued, an attempt to burden the
reasonable observer with knowledge of every case involving evolution
should be expected. The decision lies in the discretion of the court.
V. CONCLUSION
The academic freedom acts gave public school teachers the freedom to
explore the strengths and weaknesses of various scientific theories,
including neo-Darwinian evolution. Even though controversy exists as to
the motives and effects of these statutes, it should be noted that the court in
Edwards stated that it might permit even more than these statutes:
We do not imply that a legislature could never require that scientific
critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught.... [T]eaching a variety of
scientific theories about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might
be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of
science instruction.423
Academic freedom acts do not go as far as introducing other theories.
The academic freedom acts simply allow for the critique of scientific
controversies solely to encourage critical thinking and enhance science
education. The academic freedom acts pass all three prongs of the Lemon
test, like their cousins, the moment of silence cases. They have a clear
secular purpose of fostering critical thinking, they neither advance nor
inhibit religion, and they do not cause excessive government entanglement
with religion. Consequently, the academic freedom acts do not violate the
Establishment Clause. Any opposition to the academic freedom acts exists
solely in the speculation of what a teacher might do, not what the acts allow.
Just as the students were free in the moment of silence cases to do as they
pleased, so are the students that hear the scientific critiques. Justice
O'Connor reminded the Court that, "a moment of silence is not inherently
religious."4 24 Neither is a scientific critique.
422. Id.
423. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593-94 (1987) (emphasis added).
424. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,72 (1985).
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